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Abstract
Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases,
but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings.
This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions.
We test experimentally two di↵erent anchor types. The announcement
of a random group identification number but also of an upper bid
limit in the first-price sealed-bid auction result in higher bids. We
show that such behavior can be explained as a rational response to
biased beliefs. In Dutch auctions, the e↵ect of a starting price, is
negative. We demonstrate that the long-established ranking that the
Dutch auction generates lower revenue than the first-price sealed-bid
auction crucially depends on the size of the anchor.
Keywords : Anchoring Bias; Games; Incomplete Information; Auctions
JEL Codes : D44, D91, C72, C91
1 Introduction
Since the initial discovery of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), anchoring is
recognized as one of the most prevalent kinds of behavioral biases. As Kah-
neman (2011) argues, it stems from an estimate of an unknown value that
is biased toward a particular irrelevant number observed before estimating
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that value. The pervasiveness and relevance of the anchoring e↵ect have
been shown in many real-life situations including trivial judgments, price
estimates for lotteries, purchasing decisions, and negotiations.1 Despite the
well-documented bias in individual decision-making, there is surprisingly lit-
tle knowledge about how anchoring a↵ects behavior in strategic interactions.
In this paper, we study whether and how strategies are influenced by anchor-
ing in games of incomplete information.
The concept of anchoring in games appears in the experimental as well
as the empirical literature, but, to the best of our knowledge, a systematic
controlled test is missing. There is experimental evidence that anchoring
plays a role in asset markets (Baghestanian and Walker, 2015), negotiation
(Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001) and di↵erent auction settings (Holst et al.,
2015; Medcalfe, 2016; Wolk and Spann, 2008; Peeters et al., 2016; Trautmann
and Traxler, 2010; Ku et al., 2006).2 However, it is a common feature of these
studies that they do not systematically control for information sets. Hence,
unambiguous causal inference is di cult. First, subjects in these experiments
are typically exposed to other numerical values that may serve as anchors and
influence behavior. Second, all these papers, with the exception of Peeters et
al. (2016), do not use induced types and cannot specify whether anchoring
comes from impaired judgment about the own type or whether this is a direct
e↵ect on choice.3
Our article tests hypotheses of prevalence and the direction of anchoring
bias in games. In doing so, we make use of laboratory experiments with
di↵erently framed anchors in a competitive bidding game. Thereby, we focus
on anchors that are clearly irrelevant for the computation of the (optimal)
strategy. As our evidence shows, there is a significant anchoring bias: ex-
posing players to irrelevant numbers has a significant e↵ect on their choice
of strategy. As we induce subject types, judgment on the own type cannot
influence the outcomes. Hence, we argue that the observed bias is a direct
1A substantial literature, mainly in psychology, analyzes anchoring, focusing on ro-
bustness and prevalence (Meub and Proeger, 2015; Green et al., 1998; Ariely et al., 2003;
Simmons et al., 2010) and the role of cognitive process and abilities (Bergman et al., 2010;
Mussweiler, 2001; Epley and Gilovich, 2001).
2Luccasen (2012) investigates anchoring e↵ects in a public good game with complete
information and finds no evidence of anchoring.
3Peeters et al. (2016) show that a temporary buy price in English auctions with proxy-
bidding may be considered as a particular type of an anchor. Since the buy price is
informative, distinguishing the information e↵ect from the anchoring e↵ect is not possible.
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e↵ect of the anchor on the subjects’ strategic choices.
Following Kahneman (2011), we define an anchor as an obviously irrel-
evant number that might influence behavior in a way that is inconsistent
with rational decision-making. Focusing on games, we use a more detailed
terminology as we are specifically interested in strategic behavior. Based on
the two-process theory of reasoning (Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman,
2011), we distinguish between two di↵erent anchor types, type 1, “uninfor-
mative”, and type 2 or “informative” anchors. We consider a number as
a type 1 anchor (henceforth uninformative anchor) if it does not provide
any useful information for decision-making. Such a value has no meaning in
the context of the game and its e↵ect can be interpreted as a non-conscious
decision-making process tied to intuition and thus associated, using the ter-
minology of Stanovich and West (2000), with System 1.4 Such a value is
akin to most anchoring studies. It appears to the agent before forming a
judgment and comes in various contexts including irrelevant numbers about
value estimates, forecasts, identification numbers, etc. (Furnham and Boo,
2011; Chapman and Johnson, 2002).
A type 2 anchor (henceforth an informative anchor), however, might lead
to changes in the decision environment by censoring the strategy space. An-
chors that fit into this definition are plentiful and are present in a wide array
of settings. In actual markets, sellers often impose an upper price or quan-
tity limit. Some retailers routinely maximize the number of units available
to a single customer. Vendors in a marketplace start bargaining by setting
a price well above the wholesale price. Several auction markets use limits
of some sort. For example, in Dutch auctions, the starting price is such a
limit by design. Informative anchors can be interpreted in the context of the
game. Anchoring of this type, if present, can be linked to a conscious and
controlled adjustment process that is responsible for analytical thinking, and
is thus associated with System 2 (Stanovich and West, 2000).5
We investigate the role of anchors in auctions and hypothesize that an-
choring could be a relevant determinant of bidding behavior. In particular,
we seek to elaborate on well-established choice patterns in auctions, such as
overbidding and ranking auction formats by linking them to anchoring.
In our experiment, we employ independent private-value first-price sealed-
4System 1 is a cognitive process defined in the psychology literature as automatic,
largely unconscious, relatively fast, and undemanding of computational capacity.
5In contrast to System 1, System 2 is considered to be a rational choice encompassing
analytic intelligence, relatively slow, and demanding of computational capacity.
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bid (henceforth first-price) and Dutch auctions. This choice is motivated by
multiple considerations. First, these auction types are common examples of
static games of incomplete information. Second, they are relatively simple
formats commonly used in the field. Third, finding the optimal strategy is
non-trivial as, unlike in second-price and English auctions, they exhibit no
dominant strategy. Fourth, they are isomorphic, i.e., strategic equivalent,
and hence share the same Bayesian equilibrium set.
As uninformative anchors, we employ integer numbers used to determine
the group matching in the auctions. Obviously, this value carries no useful
information to the player regarding the choice of the bid. As informative
anchors, the numbers constitute either a starting price in the Dutch or a
commonly known upper bid limit in the first-price auction. All numbers
used as anchors are higher than the upper bound of the interval from which
bidder valuations are drawn, and consequently, above the upper bound of
the equilibrium strategy set.
We test for the prevalence and direction of the e↵ects of the two di↵erent
anchor types and the interplay between them. Our results contribute to the
understanding of the scope of anchoring e↵ects and their role in the cognitive
process of Systems 1 and 2.
Varying the informative anchor in Dutch auctions enables us also to iden-
tify the e↵ect of an irrelevant starting price in dynamic auctions (Trautmann
and Traxler, 2010). Comparing first-price and Dutch auctions in this en-
vironment allows for separately testing anchoring triggered by the maximal
permissible bid and the time e↵ect. While the Dutch format imposes on
subjects an externally given time frame, there is no time limit to decide on a
bid in first-price auctions. Hence, di↵erences in behavior may be due to the
time span available for analytical and rational thinking.
Our analysis delivers evidence on the prevalence of anchoring bias in
games of incomplete information. In first-price auctions, we find consistent
and robust e↵ects. Introducing an uninformative anchor or a high informa-
tive anchor (upper bid limit) results in higher bids. With a simple model,
we demonstrate that accounting for upward-biased beliefs explains the over-
bidding phenomenon in first-price auctions. In contrast, in Dutch auctions,
an informative anchor (higher starting price) leads to lower bids. The latter
result is consistent with the potential e↵ect of stronger bid shading triggered
by a longer time frame. Our results also shed new light on the classical non-
isomorphism problem between the two auction formats (Kagel, 1995). We
show that the conventional wisdom that Dutch auctions exhibit lower bids
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may be driven by the maximal permissible bid (upper bid limit resp. starting
price) and may not hold in general.
In the following, Section 2 formally defines anchoring in Bayesian games.
Section 3 gives a description of the experimental design. Next, Section 4
includes a detailed analysis of the data, including robustness checks. Section
5 o↵ers a model to show that our observations on anchoring are consistent
with biased beliefs. Finally, we conclude with a discussion in Section 6.
2 Theory
In this section, we discuss anchoring in Bayesian games. By doing so, we
extend the model of Harsa´nyi (1967) with additional dimensions of the type
space.
2.1 Anchoring in Games of Incomplete Information
Consider a normal-form game of incomplete information with a set of players
I. Each player i 2 I has a payo↵ function ui(vi, a1, . . . aI), where ai is the
action choice of player i. The type of each player, vi, is a random variable
chosen by nature that is observed only by player i. The joint probability
distribution of the types is given by F (v1, . . . , vI , ), which is assumed to be
common knowledge among players. A strategy of player i is a function bi(vi)
that specifies player i’s action choice ai for each realization of their type vi.
Next, consider an extended game of incomplete information. The type
of each player i is a vector (vi, ci), where ci may be multi-dimensional, i.e.,
ci = (ci1, . . . , cik), k   1. The joint probability distribution of players’ types is
given by F (v1, . . . , vI , c1, . . . , cI). A strategy of player i is a function bi(vi, ci)
that specifies player i’s action choice ai for each realization of their type
(vi, ci). Player i’s payo↵ function, however, remains ui(vi, a1, . . . , aI), i.e.,
depends on the action choices of all players as well as on one part of the
player i’s type, vi, but not on ci. All elements of ci, vi as well as ai are drawn
from the same ordered set (S,⌫).
In the following, we distinguish anchors as the elements of ci, based on
their role in shaping the components of the game. That is, each element of
ci, shall be one of two anchor types.
An uninformative anchor is a number cij 2 S which is included in the
player’s type but does not imply any further changes in the game structure,
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neither in the set of the permissible strategies nor in the payo↵ function.
In contrast, an informative anchor, cij 2 S, does imply a change in the
set of the permissible strategies as follows: First, it restricts the range of the
strategy function such that cij ⌫ ai must hold. Second, in that way, it only
eliminates weakly dominated strategies. However, the informative anchor
does not change the payo↵ function, that is, ui(vi, a1, . . . , aI) remains the
same for all feasible ai.
This model allows for single or multiple anchors with uniform or mixed
types. Consider a Bayesian game G where weakly dominated strategies do
not belong to any Bayesian equilibrium of the game. Suppose G0 is the
corresponding anchoring game as defined above. Then, the set of Bayesian
equilibria in G and G0 are the same.
2.2 Auction Model
The setting studied in our experiment employs two bidders who compete for
a single indivisible good. A bidder’s valuation vi is independently drawn from
a uniform distribution with a support [v, v], where 0 < v < v. In a Dutch
clock auction, an observable clock displays a price that starts at a number
and gradually sinks. The starting price is strictly above the upper bound of
the valuations, v, i.e., the highest possible valuation. The format is a winner-
pay auction. That is, the winner receives her valuation for the good and pays
an amount equal to her bid, giving payo↵ vi  bi. The loser receives a payo↵
of 0. The first-price sealed-bid auction entails a simultaneous submission of
bids. The winner and payo↵s are determined in the same way as in the Dutch
auction.
The two auction mechanisms can be easily augmented to fall into the
set of Bayesian games defined in the previous subsection. Consider a two-
dimensional vector of anchors ci = (ci1, ci2), cij 2 R+ [ ;, with no more
than one of each anchor type. Any positive number ci1 that does not change
any components of the auction game can be employed as an uninformative
anchor. An informative anchor is present by design in the Dutch auction, as
the starting price serves as an upper limit of bids. A starting price higher
than the highest possible valuation, v, can be considered as an informative
anchor ci2. The first-price sealed-bid auction has an equivalent anchor if an
upper limit ci2 is set such that only bids satisfying bi  ci2, where ci2 > v are
permitted.
In equilibrium, if bidders are rational, regardless of the anchor types,
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Limit/Starting Price
Low High No
First Price
Group Number FPGN95 FPGN115 FPGN
No Group Number FPNA95 FPNA115 FPNA
Silent Dutch
Group Number SDGN95 SDGN115 -
No Group Number SDNA95 SDNA115 -
Table 1: Summary of the treatments
Treatment Starting Price/Limit Group Number Sessions N
(Informative Anchor) (Uninformative Anchor)
FPNA - No 1 24
FPNA95 95 No 1 24
FPNA115 115 No 1 24
FPGN - Yes 1 24
FPGN95 95 Yes 1 22
FPGN115 115 Yes 1 24
SDNA95 95 No 1 22
SDNA115 115 No 1 24
SDGN95 95 Yes 1 22
SDGN115 115 Yes 1 22
Total 10 232
Table 2: Summary of sessions
b⇤i (vi, ci1, ci2) = b
⇤
i (vi) . The two auction mechanisms are strategically equiv-
alent. Hence, the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium with risk-neutral players
is
b⇤i (vi, ci1, ci2) = b
⇤
i (vi) = v +
1
2
(vi   v) (1)
for both auction formats.6
3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In the experiment, randomly matched pairs of subjects played either a first-
price sealed-bid or a (silent) Dutch auction for 20 consecutive rounds divided
6There is a rich literature addressing di↵erences between static and dynamic auction
mechanisms. We provide a discussion of the failure of isomorphism in Subsection 4.5.
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into four blocks of five auctions each. In each auction, the player with the
highest bid won the auction and obtained a payo↵ equal to her value minus
her bid. The loser did not pay and did not receive anything. Subjects
received no feedback on either their payo↵s or the opponents’ bids until the
end of all 20 auctions. Hence, each bid yields an independent observation.
Furthermore, this design characteristic allows us, in contrast to previous
studies, to observe behavior that is not potentially anchored by any type of
feedback e↵ects. It is reasonable to assume that interim feedback has such
an e↵ect (Peeters et al., 2016).
All values were denoted in a fictitious currency termed ECU for Experi-
mental Currency Unit. The private valuations of the bidders in each round
were randomly drawn integers from the set V = {30, 31, . . . , 89, 90} with all
valuations vi 2 V being equally likely. After seeing their valuation draw,
subjects were asked to submit their bid. In the first-price (FP) auctions,
subjects could choose non-negative integer bids no higher than 95 or 115 in
some treatments. In other treatments, no bid limit was imposed. This was
common knowledge. In the silent Dutch (SD) auctions, a clock was displayed
on the screen showing the current price. The starting price was set to either
95 or 115 and was sinking at a rate of 1 ECU per 0.5 seconds. Bidders were
able to stop the clock at any point, and the clock value in that moment de-
termined their bid. Thus, in both auction types, bidders could submit bids
below the lowest possible private valuation vi = 30 as well as above the high-
est possible valuation vi = 90. Unlike in a standard Dutch auction, bidders
received no feedback in the silent format.7 That is, the clock reached zero
and there was no indication of the other subject’s bid.
In the experiment, we employed a between-subjects design. Table 1 gives
an overview of all treatments. The fundamental statistics are summarized in
Table 2. The treatments di↵er with respect to the existence and the type of
the anchor as well as the auction format.
In the Group Number (GN) treatments, at the beginning of each block,
a number between 91 and 120 was randomly assigned to each subject in
the following way.8 Each participant draws a chip from one of two identical
7Turocy et al. (2007) use this mechanism in order to achieve the feedback environment
of a first-price sealed-bid auction in the Dutch auction. Levin et al. (2016) coined the
terms active and silent clock auctions.
8The numbers were predetermined and were as follows: 91, 93, 95, 98, 101, 103, 108,
111, 113, 115, 118, and 120 for 24 subjects; 91, 93, 95, 98, 101, 106, 111, 113, 115, 118
and 120 for 22 subjects.
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urns, without replacing the chip. The numbers on the chips in both urns
were the same, and the number of chips in the urns was the same as the
number of participants in a session. Thus, there was always a pair of subjects
receiving the same number. This number determined the subject’s group for
five auctions and it was reassigned at the beginning of each block. The
No Anchor (NA) treatments featured no uninformative anchor. In those
treatments, groups were assigned using z-Tree’s random number generator
function.
The informative anchor, i.e., the maximal permissible bid, varied between
but not within treatments. In the ’95’ treatments, the starting price in the
silent Dutch auction, respectively the bid limit in the first-price auction, was
set to 95, in the ’115’ treatments, to 115. There is no such a number in the
names of the treatments with no upper limit. For example, treatment FPNA
features first-price auctions without anchors, i.e., with no group number and
no upper limit of bids. Similarly, in SDGN115, subjects participated in silent
Dutch auctions with an uninformative anchor and a starting price of 115.
At the end of each session, we also collected data on cognitive abilities
using a 5-minute Raven test, individual risk preferences using a lottery ex-
periment, and some demographic characteristics such as gender and age.
The experiment was conducted between May 2018 and January 2019, at
the Technische Universita¨t Berlin. Participants were students (33% female),
mostly from economics, natural sciences, or engineering. We ran 10 sessions
with 232 subjects. In each session, an even number of subjects, between
22 and 24, participated. All experimental sessions were conducted with the
use of the computer-based software system z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
average length of a session was 70 minutes. The cash conversion rate was: 1
ECU = 0.04 EUR.9 After explaining the rules, subjects had to fill out a short
test before they were allowed to participate in the experiment. The average
total earnings per subject amounted to 16.36 EUR including a show-up fee of
5 EUR.10 A translated version of the instructions as well as the test questions
can be found in the web appendix.
91 EUR= 1.15 USD at the time of the experiment.
10In order to guarantee non-negative payo↵s, subjects received a payment of 0 for the
auction part of the experiment if the total profit in that part was negative.
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3.1 Hypotheses
If one assumes that subjects are rational, their bidding behavior should not
be influenced by the existence of anchors. However, based on previous re-
search from other domains showing strong anchoring e↵ects, we hypothesize
that the presence of anchors may systematically bias bidding behavior. Given
the cumulative evidence that high anchors increase value judgments, we hy-
pothesize that bids in the anchoring games would be higher than bids in the
control games in both auction formats.
Hypothesis 1 (Uninformative Anchors):
The announcement of the group number has a positive e↵ect on bids.
Hypothesis 2 (Informative Anchors):
2a: The announcement of a bid limit has a positive e↵ect on the bids in
first-price sealed-bid auctions.
2b: In first-price as well as in Dutch auctions, the value of the bid limit,
resp. starting price has a positive e↵ect on bids.
The experiment was designed with the intent of testing the role of unin-
formative as well as informative anchors. By design, an informative anchor is
always present in a Dutch auction in the form of a starting price. Therefore,
testing Hypothesis 2a is not feasible in Dutch auctions.
Hypothesis 2b is consistent with several theories o↵ered in the auction
literature. The utility of suspense theory (Cox et al., 1983) assumes that
players exhibit an additional utility from playing the game that diminishes
in time.11 In the context of Dutch auctions, it means that at any price,
11The model of Cox et al. (1983) expresses the expected utility of player i in the addi-
tively separable form
Ui(bi) = ↵i(t) +   [vi   bi]ri Fi(bi) (2)
in which ↵i(t) is the utility from playing for time t,   is a weight parameter, F(i)(bi) is
the probability of winning, and 1  ri is the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant relative risk
aversion. The second term expressing the utility from the auction does not increase with a
higher starting price in a symmetric game as Fi(bi) is the probability of vi > vj . Assuming
that ↵i(t) is concave, at any point of time, the marginal utility of postponing stopping the
clock is lower.
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agents obtain lower marginal utility from keeping the clock running. Hence,
a higher starting price results in higher equilibrium bids.
Performing experiments in two-sided auctions, Isaac and Plott (1981)
and also Smith and Williams (1981) find evidence of the so-called “Bu↵er
hypothesis”: bids significantly bound away from a binding or non-binding
upper limit set by the experimenter.12 Consistent with their findings, in our
experiment, higher limit may result in higher bids if the di↵erence between
the limit and the maximum of observed bids is su ciently high.
Furthermore, the starting price also determines the time frame of choosing
the bidding strategy. As evidenced in the literature, time e↵ects persist in
dynamic auctions. Using data from both first-price and Dutch auctions, it is
possible to identify the e↵ect of the starting price.
Hypothesis 3 (Multiple Anchors):
3a: The exposure to both anchors has a positive e↵ect on bids.
3b: The interaction between the two anchors has a negative e↵ect on bids.
In actual settings, when making a decision, agents are often exposed to
an array of anchors. While the aggregate e↵ect may be positive, (Whyte
and Sebenius, 1997), there is no sound empirical evidence for the existence
of explosive anchoring e↵ects. In fact, Zhang et al. (2014) provide laboratory
and empirical evidence of negative interaction e↵ects.
4 Results
4.1 Overview of Bidding Behavior
In the experiment, we observe a total of 4,640 bidding decisions, (first-price
auction: 142 bidders ⇥ 20 auctions= 2,840; Dutch auction: 90 bidders ⇥
20 auctions =1,800). With the experimental parameters, a rational risk-
neutral agent bids according to the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium
b⇤i (vi) = 15 +
1
2vi. The distributions of the relative deviation of the observed
bids from the equilibrium bids, i.e., overbidding ratio bi b
⇤
i
b⇤i
, for the di↵erent
12A non-binding limit is not an uninformative anchor in our framework as it is inter-
preted in the context of the strategy space. However, in our framework, the binding limit
constitutes an informative anchor as it censors the strategy space.
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the overbidding ratio (Uninformative
anchor) in first-price and silent Dutch auctions
treatments are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates the role of the
uninformative anchor, Figure 2 the role of the informative anchor.
Figure 1 is consistent with Hypothesis 1. The upper-left graph in that Fig-
ure compares the treatments in which there is no informative anchor (FPGN
vs. FPNA) and illustrates that using an uninformative anchor (group num-
ber) increases bids.
In all other comparisons between treatments with and without an unin-
formative anchor, there is no clear evidence. As these comparisons feature
treatments with an informative anchor, this observation is consistent with
Hypothesis 3b which implies that anchoring e↵ects are not additive.
As evident from Figure 2, comparisons of treatments with di↵erent in-
formative anchors support Hypothesis 2a but Hypothesis 2b only partly.
Introducing a (higher) bid limit does increase bids in first-price auctions,
as evidenced by the two upper graphs. This, however, is not the case in
Dutch auctions, where a higher starting price decreases bids, as evidenced
by the two lower graphs. We perform two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
to provide statistical evidence on all these results. Coe cients show these
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the overbidding ratio (Informative
anchor) in first-price and silent Dutch auctions
di↵erences hold with a 5% or lower significance level.13
4.2 Anchoring in First-Price Auctions
The aim of our estimation strategy is to test for the presence of anchoring
e↵ects in bidding as hypothesized in Section 3.1. As we demonstrate, the
informative and the uninformative anchor play a role in the bidding strategy.
The experimental design distinguishes first-price auction treatments along
two dimensions. First, they di↵er in their upper bid limit, which is either not
imposed or it is fixed to either a (low) value of 95 or a (high) value of 115.
Second, each of these conditions is implemented with and without providing
a group number. The two dimensions correspond to the informative and
uninformative anchors, respectively. Keeping our hypotheses in mind, we
estimate Model (3).
13A complete list of tests is provided in the web appendix.
13
bit = ↵ +  1vit +  2D +  3D115 +  4GN +  5D ⇥GN +  6D115 ⇥GN +  Xi + "it
(3)
In the equation above, the decision of bidder i in auction t over bid
bi is modeled as a function of the bidder’s valuation. The e↵ects of the
di↵erent types of anchors are captured by the dummy variables D, D115,
and GN : D is equal to 1, if there is a bid limit, D115 is equal to 1 if the
bid limit is high (115), GN is equal to 1 if there is a group number. The
literature suggests that exposure to multiple anchors may have a non-zero
interaction e↵ect. In order to address this, if the subset of data allows, we also
include interaction terms that test for interaction e↵ects between informative
and uninformative anchors. In all models, Xi is the set of control variables
including period, gender, age, measures of risk preferences and cognitive
abilities, and "it denotes the error term with standard normal distribution.14
Using model (3), we estimate the average treatment e↵ects and test the
hypotheses. The regression results for di↵erent specifications of the model
are listed in Table 3. In all specifications, the highly significant coe cient
of valuation vi is consistent with the descriptive data. First, bids are mainly
driven by valuation. Second, the estimates around 0.68 show that bidders
are sensitive to these values which greatly surpass the Bayesian equilibrium
prediction of 0.5. These results corroborate the well-established overbidding
phenomenon in first-price auctions. Specification (1) o↵ers support for Hy-
pothesis 1. It shows that introducing an uninformative anchor, i.e., having a
group number, does increase bids. The coe cient is large and significant at
0.1% level.
The subsample in specification (4) includes all observations without a
group number and allows us to investigate the e↵ect of the existence and
size of the informative anchor (i.e., the upper bid limit). Specification (4)
shows that the very presence of a bid limit has no e↵ect on bids. However,
introducing a high informative anchor (D115) has a significant positive e↵ect:
it increases bids by 4.07 on average. This provides support for Hypothesis
2b.15
14A complete list of the variables can be found in web appendix.
15The positive e↵ect of the upper limit is consistent with the bu↵er hypothesis of Isaac
and Plott (1981) and Smith and Williams (1981). As they present it, removing limits
may increase o↵ers. However, we find evidence that the uninformative anchor also a↵ects
14
Specifications (2) and (3) indicate that, if there is a bid limit (95 or
115), introducing an uninformative anchor has a weakly significant positive
(if the bid limit is low) and negative (if the bid limit is high) e↵ect on bids.
Specification (5) also addresses the e↵ect of the exposure to a second anchor.
It reveals no significant e↵ect of the introduction of a bid limit when an
uninformative anchor is already present. Taken together, the results of all
three specifications, (2), (3), and (5), indicate that if multiple anchors are
present, the observed anchoring e↵ect is driven mainly by the uninformative
anchor.
Finally, specification (6), which includes all observations, indicates that
the mere existence of a bid limit has no e↵ect on bids. However, a high limit
does anchor bidders and increases bids by 5.04 on average. A similar pattern
is observed when the group number is used. Exposure to an uninformative
anchor increases bids by 2.63. Both coe cients are significant at a 0.1% level.
We pay special attention to the interaction terms. The estimates provide
some support for Hypothesis 3b as both of them are negative. Hence, intro-
ducing a second anchor if one anchor has already been applied has a weaker
total e↵ect on bids than without it. That is, the estimated di↵erence between
FPGN and FPGN115 equals  2+ 3+ 5+ 6 =  1.04+5.04 0.67 5.76 =
 2.43. In contrast, the same di↵erence between FPNA and FPNA115 is
 1.04 + 5.04 = 4.00. Yet, the total anchoring e↵ect, the di↵erence be-
tween FPNA and FPGN115 is estimated to be  2 +  3 +  4 +  5 +  6 =
 1.04+5.04+2.63 0.67 5.76 = 0.20, which is positive. This corroborates
Hypothesis 3a.
We find no evidence that the sequence of periods plays a role in bid-
ding. This pattern is probably a consequence of the experimental design as
participants were not given feedback at any point before the end of the 20
auctions. The other control variables are also not significant or if significant,
not robust.
4.3 Anchoring in Dutch Auctions
Anchoring in the Dutch auctions is investigated using a similar model. By
design, Dutch auctions always feature an informative anchor as a starting
price has to be set. Thus, in the case of the Dutch auction we use a slightly
behavior. This pattern cannot be explained by the bu↵er theory as the group number has
no context as a limit.
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Table 3: Bidding in first-price auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Bid Bid
vi 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.62⇤⇤⇤ 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.67⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015)
D (inf. anchor) 0.12 -0.67 -1.04
(0.83) (0.98) (0.68)
D115 4.07⇤⇤⇤ -1.41 5.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.82) (0.99) (0.94)
GN (uninf. anchor) 3.40⇤⇤⇤ 2.27⇤ -2.09⇤ 2.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.71) (0.98) (1.06) (0.71)
D ⇥ GN -0.67
(1.19)
D115 ⇥ GN -5.76⇤⇤⇤
(1.41)
Period 0.092 0.022 -0.0058 0.16⇤⇤ -0.090 0.038
(0.056) (0.082) (0.086) (0.057) (0.067) (0.047)
Includes observations
With Group Number No Yes Yes
Without Group Number Yes No Yes
Without limit Yes No No
With limit 95 No Yes No
With limit 115 No No Yes
Observations 960 920 960 1440 1400 2840
Adjusted R2 0.5836 0.3888 0.4366 0.4947 0.4274 0.4347
OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
All specifications include controls (gender, age, measures of risk preferences, and cognitive abilities).
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modified model:
bit = ↵ +  1vit +  3D115 +  4GN +  6D115 ⇥GN +  Xi + "it. (4)
The notations are analogous to that of the first-price auction. In the context
of Dutch auctions, dummy variable D115 denotes treatments with a high
starting price of 115.
As Table 4 shows, similarly to the first-price auction, bids are driven by
valuations and the coe cients are comparable. Again, there is no time trend
as none of the coe cient estimates of the period number is significant at a
5% level.
However, compared to the first-price auction, there are remarkable di↵er-
ences regarding the role of anchors. The uninformative anchor has a positive
e↵ect on bids only in treatments with a high starting price, as evidenced
in specification (2). The informative anchor’s e↵ect, i.e., the level of the
starting price, is the opposite of what we evidenced in the first-price auction:
Higher starting price results in significantly lower bids. This result is robust
independently of the perspective we take in our sample: whole sample, spec-
ifications (5), two disjoint sub-samples, with and without an uninformative
anchor, specifications (3) and (4). Thus, the negative starting-price e↵ect
contradicts not only Hypothesis 2b but also the utility of suspense theory
that predicts higher bids with higher starting prices. We investigate this
remarkable result in detail in Subsection 4.5.
There is a crucial di↵erence in the bidding process between the two auc-
tion formats. After the auction start, the time interval for making a decision
is only restricted in the Dutch auction. Thus, in the treatments SDNA115
(resp. SDGN115), compared to the SDNA95 (resp. SDGN95), there is ef-
fectively more time available to reach a decision. This allows subjects to be
engaged for a longer time span in analytical and rational thinking, which
is needed for the adjustment process of “moving” from the anchor (i.e., the
starting price). In the context of auctions, this means improving the decision
in the sense of mitigating overbidding and, consequently, achieving a higher
profit.
4.4 Revenue and E ciency
In the context of auctions, one may wonder whether anchoring a↵ects revenue
and e ciency. In an auction, e ciency is solely determined by the final
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Table 4: Bidding in silent Dutch auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Bid
vi 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016)
GN 0.87 3.23⇤⇤⇤ -0.34
(0.84) (0.85) (0.81)
D115 -3.92⇤⇤⇤ -1.54⇤ -3.41⇤⇤⇤
(0.94) (0.73) (0.80)
D115 ⇥ GN 1.30
(1.20)
Period 0.066 -0.025 0.037 -0.00081 0.019
(0.069) (0.062) (0.076) (0.055) (0.048)
Includes observations
With Group Number No Yes Yes
Without Group Number Yes No Yes
With starting price 95 Yes No
With starting price 115 No Yes
Observations 880 920 920 880 1800
Adjusted R2 0.5551 0.5605 0.4742 0.6323 0.5287
OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
All specifications include controls (gender, age, measures of risk preferences, and cognitive abilities).
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allocation of the good. The outcome is e cient if and only if the winner is the
bidder with the highest valuation. In the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium,
the bid strategy is monotone in valuation, hence, the allocation is always
e cient. However, if bidders exhibit anchoring bias, this result does not
hold anymore.
To see this, consider the following simplified example with two players.
Suppose bidders are exposed to an uninformative anchor akin to our first-
price auction with a group number but no limit (FPGN). Valuations are
drawn independently and identically from [v, v¯] and anchors ci1 are drawn
from [c, c¯], both with uniform distribution. Assume that the two bidders
submit a strategy bi(vi, ci1), resp. bj(vj, cj1), which is monotone in both
parameters and symmetric. Suppose two bidders i, j have anchors ci1 >
cj1. If j has a higher valuation, it is possible that the di↵erence in anchors
dominates.16
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest for both
formats. Average prices (column 1) and profits (column 2) as well as e -
ciency (columns 3 and 4) are quite comparable to those reported in other
auction experiments.17 There are no substantial di↵erences in the average
prices between the two auction formats. The lowest price plus the lowest
variance are observed in first-price auctions without anchors. In first-price
auctions, the exposure to both types of anchors leads to significantly higher
revenue, and consequently lower bidder earnings. Moreover, e ciency is sig-
nificantly reduced when an informative anchor (bid limit) is present. In con-
trast, we do not observe considerable anchoring e↵ects on price or e ciency
in the Dutch auctions.18
16Note that this example does not rely on imposing an equilibrium concept on behavior.
17In the experiment, we measure the e ciency rate as E = vwinnermax{vj ,vj} .
18We estimate the reduced-form model Et = ↵ +  Yt + "t in which the independent
variables include dummies for the maximal permissible bid (95,115), group number, and
the interaction terms. We perform this for both auction formats separately and find that
the only significant coe cient is the presence of a bid limit in the first-price auction with
a negative value -0.022 (standard error 0.008). The same model for the seller’s revenue
yields that it is 7.78 higher if the bid limit is higher (se. 1.49) and 6.22 higher if there is
a group number (se. 1.49).
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics (mean values; std. deviation in parentheses)
Treatment Price Profit E ciency
Average % of e↵. allocation
FPNA 52.25 8.35 0.98 87
(11.72) (10.57) (0.07)
FPNA95 52.91 6.55 0.96 73
(14.45) (11.26) (0.09)
FPNA115 60.70 3.39 0.95 75
(20.42) (14.52) (0.11)
FPGN 58.48 4.72 0.97 83
(15.85) (11.06) (0.08)
FPGN95 56.55 4.51 0.95 73
(16.92) (13.27) (0.12)
FPGN115 58.73 5.05 0.97 78
(17.01) (11.47) (0.09)
SDNA95 57.02 5.62 0.96 78
(17.15) (14.15) (0.10)
SDNA115 54.90 6.85 0.97 82
(14.45) (11.34) (0.08)
SDGN95 55.38 6.39 0.97 80
(12.98) (9.23) (0.08)
SDGN115 52.37 7.72 0.96 77
(12.59) (10.86) (0.08)
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4.5 The Failure of Isomorphism Between First-Price
and Dutch Auctions
The estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 reveal the inconsistent but signif-
icant e↵ects of the informative anchor on bids in the two auction formats.
While in the first-price auction a higher bid limit does result in higher bids,
in the Dutch auction, the e↵ect is the opposite, with a higher starting price
resulting in lower bids.
Table 6 tests for the source of the non-isomorphism between the two auc-
tion formats using the whole subsample in which bids are limited either by
an explicit maximum bid or by a starting price. All specifications estimate
the e↵ect of a higher maximal permissible bid separately in the two auction
formats. We achieve this by including an interaction term between the auc-
tion format and the maximal permissible bid (upper bid limit resp. starting
price).
Specification (1) confirms the well-known ranking result from the litera-
ture, showing that bids are significantly lower in the Dutch than in first-price
sealed-bid auctions (Kagel, 1995). Two alternative hypotheses that explain
the non-isomorphism between the two auction formats are the utility of sus-
pense theory and the Bayesian miscalculation (Cox et al., 1983).
In Dutch auctions, the utility of suspense theory implies that a higher
starting price should result in higher bids. However, as shown in the previous
section, we observe the opposite e↵ect.
The Bayesian miscalculation hypothesis concerns another type of behav-
ioral bias. In a Dutch auction, a bidder, upon observing the clock, learns
whether the opponent pressed the button at a given price. While this does
not imply any Bayesian updating of one’s strategy, this information sup-
presses bids and constitutes a Bayesian miscalculation. Generally speaking,
Bayesian updating assumes that the player correctly or incorrectly incorpo-
rates information on the actions of other players.
In our data, Bayesian miscalculation may not influence bidding in the
same sense. In a silent Dutch auction, players observe a clock but receive
no information about the opponent’s strategy as it is common knowledge
that the clock will continue to go down until 0. Thus, a subject never learns
whether the opponent pressed the button or not at any given price.
The failure of isomorphism between first-price and Dutch auctions in our
data appears to be mainly driven by the starting price or bid limit and may
be arbitrary. We identify two opposing patterns. First, in specifications (2)-
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(4), the coe cients reveal that a higher informative anchor, i.e., higher bid
limit, resp. starting price, of 115 (dummy variable D115), is associated with
higher bids (significant in all cases at a 0.1% level). However, the interaction
term reveals that the opposite happens in Dutch auctions (significant in all
cases at a 0.1% level). Overall, the total e↵ect is negative in the dynamic
format. Controlling for the auction format suggests that changing to the
Dutch auction itself does not change bidding behavior substantially for a
lower bid limit. Finally, the e↵ect of the uninformative anchor (i.e., the
group number dummy GN) is not significant.
We also perform OLS estimations on the seller’s revenue and the winner’s
payo↵. Models (5) and (6) yield consistent results. Bids are negatively
a↵ected in the Dutch and positively in the first-price auctions by the maximal
permissible bid. We can observe the same e↵ect in terms of the seller’s
revenue. For the winner’s payo↵, we find that the auction winner enjoys a
higher payo↵ with an increase of the starting price in the Dutch auction.
The estimates are also consistent in the sense that the e↵ect of the bid limit
(dummy variable D115) as well as the interaction e↵ect (D115 ⇥ Dutch) are
highly significant in all models.
Based on our data, Figure 3 illustrates the non-isomorphism between the
auction formats. Using Specification (3) of Table 6, we display the predicted
mean bid as a function of the upper bid limit in the first-price and of the
starting price in the Dutch auctions. The two functions show that the gap is
heavily influenced by the maximal permissible bid. In fact, depending on this
parameter, one may observe any ranking between the two auction formats.19
The experimental literature usually supports that Dutch auctions deliver
lower bids. In particular, when comparing first-price sealed bid and (silent)
Dutch experimental auctions with identical maximal permissible bids, Tur-
ocy et al. (2007) find the same empirical regularity. However, there is also
empirical evidence of a reversed ranking in prices. Reiley (1999) observes
higher prices, on average, in Dutch vs. first-price auction field experiments
on the Internet. Our results suggest that the sign and the magnitude of the
gap between bidding strategies and revenue in the two formats may be driven
19Note that this figure merely illustrates that the lack of isomorphism as well as the
direction of the di↵erence between the first-price and Dutch auctions can be explained by
the di↵erences in maximal permissible bids. It does not imply that outside of the examined
range, there is a monotonic relationship between maximal permissible bid and expected
bids in either auction format.
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Table 6: Bidding, revenue, and winner’s payo↵ in first-price and silent Dutch
auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Revenue Winner’s payo↵
bi bi bi bi bwinner vwinner   bwinner
vi 0.68⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Dutch -1.33⇤⇤ 1.17 0.57 1.38 0.85
(0.46) (0.66) (0.66) (1.07) (1.00)
D115 2.17⇤⇤⇤ 2.75⇤⇤⇤ 2.40⇤⇤⇤ 4.64⇤⇤⇤ -2.72⇤⇤
(0.56) (0.65) (0.64) (1.05) (0.98)
D115 ⇥Dutch -3.71⇤⇤⇤ -4.89⇤⇤⇤ -4.35⇤⇤⇤ -7.41⇤⇤⇤ 5.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.65) (0.93) (0.92) (1.50) (1.40)
GN -0.64 -0.30 -0.37 0.65
(0.46) (0.46) (0.75) (0.70)
Period 0.015 0.015 -0.055 0.11
(0.040) (0.039) (0.064) (0.061)
Control Variables No No No Yes No No
Observations 3680 3680 3680 3680 1840 1840
Adjusted R2 0.4154 0.4192 0.4195 0.4363 0.0317 0.0206
OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001.
All specifications include controls (gender, age, measures of risk preferences, and cognitive abilities).
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Figure 3: Estimated mean bids in first-price (solid) and Dutch (dashed)
auctions as a function of the maximal permissible bid for the range of bids
above the upper bound of the interval from which bidder valuations are
drawn, v¯ = 90.
by the size of the maximal permissible bid.20
4.6 Control With Low Anchors
We find evidence of upward bias if bidders are exposed to irrelevant num-
bers that are above the highest possible valuation. To check whether the
anchoring bias persists if the subjects are exposed to other numbers, for ex-
ample, that are below the lowest possible valuation, we perform a robustness
check by conducting an additional treatment. The new treatment, FPLGN,
is identical to the treatment with a group number (FPGN), only with one
di↵erence. Instead of high numbers between 91 and 120, the group number
assumes values between 1 and 29.21 Note that the numbers used as uninfor-
mative anchors are distinct from valuations and fall below the lower limit of
equilibrium bids.
20Katok and Kwasnica (2008) demonstrate that the ranking of the two auction formats
may also depend on the clock speed in Dutch auctions.
21The uninformative anchors are 1, 3, 5, 8, 11, 14, 16, 19, 22, 25, 27, 29 for 24 subjects.
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Overbidding with anchors is a robust finding. Comparing the FPNA
treatment (first-price auction without group number) and FPLGN treatment
shows that introducing a low uninformative anchors leads to higher bids. The
OLS estimate yields a significant coe cient (4.5021) of the treatment dummy
(which equals 1 if there is a group number) at a 5% level (with a standard
error 0.7649).22
In the spirit of Kahneman (2011), we perform a comparison between low
(FPLGN) and high (FPGN) uninformative anchors. High numbers do induce
higher bids, but the estimated coe cient of the treatment dummy (which
equals 1 if the group number is high) is not significant at a 5% significance
level (0.1347 with a 0.9508 standard error).23
5 Anchoring Bias in Equilibrium
Our experimental results have shown that, indeed, anchoring can a↵ect bid-
der behavior. One possible explanation for anchoring bias in a strategic
setting is that the exposure to an obviously irrelevant number a↵ects a payo↵-
maximizing player in the sense that her behavior is a rational response to
biased beliefs.
Biased bidding is consistent with two strongly related arguments. First,
an anchored bidder may adjust her bid upward to increase the probability
of winning. Alternatively, a player’s beliefs about the opponent’s actions
may be biased upwards. As the probability of winning is equivalent to the
probability of having a higher bid, the two arguments are observationally
equivalent in an auction setting.
In the following, we propose a model built on the assumption that bidders
exhibit anchoring bias in the context of uninformative anchors in first-price
sealed-bid auctions. This simple model provides an additional explanation
for the overbidding phenomenon in first-price auctions. Intuitively, if a bid-
der expects to be confronted with a higher bid of her opponent due to the
anchoring bias, the best response is to shift the own bid upwards.
Consider, for example, the first-price auction with an uninformative an-
chor treatment (FPGN). The maximization problem of a bidder i with val-
uation vi in this treatment, facing an opponent j who uses identical bidding
22Same model as specification (1) in Table 3 with variable GN replaced by a dummy
variable for the corresponding treatment e↵ect.
23Same as the previous model.
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strategy bj, is
max
bi
(vi   bi)⇥c(vi),
where ⇥c(vi) is the probability of winning, in which c denotes the anchor
observed by both bidders. In a Bayesian game, in the spirit of our hypothe-
ses, a bidder knows vi. Hence, her payo↵ (vi   bi) conditional on winning is
not influenced by the anchor. However, since the bidding strategies are (up-
ward) biased, an anchored player solves an objective function with a biased
⇥c(vi). We assume that ⇥c(·) first-order stochastically dominates the type
distribution that we denote by F (vi), i.e., ⇥c(b
 1
i (bi)) = ⇥c(vi) < F (vi).
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In a symmetric equilibrium, we get for the interim expected payo↵ of
bidder i
(vi   b⇤ic)⇥c(b⇤ic 1(b⇤ic)). (5)
where b⇤ic = b
⇤
i (vi, c) = b
⇤
ic(vi) is the unique symmetric Bayesian equilib-
rium with anchor c. Using the envelope theorem and that the lowest type v
wins with zero probability (Myerson, 1981), the equilibrium bidding function
equals
b⇤ic(vi) = vi  
R vi
v ⇥c(v˜)dv˜
⇥c(vi)
> vi  
R vi
v F (v˜)dv˜
F (vi)
= b⇤i (vi)
()
R vi
v ⇥c(v˜)dv˜
⇥c(vi)
<
R vi
v F (v˜)dv˜
F (vi)
(6)
where b⇤i (vi) is the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium with no anchor.
The second line of (6) is implied by first-order stochastic dominance. For
any vi, there exists v0i such that F (v
0
i) = ⇥c(vi). As
R vi
v F (v˜)dv˜
F (vi)
is decreasing,
(6) holds.
The argument is identical for the comparison of di↵erent anchors. Sup-
pose c0 > c and ⇥c0(vi) first-order stochastically dominates ⇥c(vi). With the
same argument, R vi
v ⇥c0(v˜)dv˜
⇥c0(vi)
<
R vi
v ⇥c(v˜)dv˜
⇥c(vi)
. (7)
24Armantier and Treich (2009) provide evidence that overbidding can be explained by
biased beliefs. The elicited bidder expectations reveal that subjects underestimate their
probability of winning the auction.
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6 Conclusion
Anchoring is known to be a pervasive behavioral judgment bias. We ex-
tend our understanding in the domain of games with incomplete information
by performing controlled experiments. In this article, we study whether
strategies are anchored. By randomly exposing subjects to numbers that are
potential anchors in the sense of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), our design
allows for drawing a causal inference and identifying anchoring bias in games
of incomplete information.
We define two concepts, uninformative (type 1) and informative (type 2)
anchors that are linked to the framework of Kahneman (2011), and apply
them in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions. In treatments with an
uninformative anchor, subjects receive an irrelevant number. This number
is presented as an identification number of the bidding group, hence it has
no meaning in the context of the particular auction. In treatments with an
informative anchor, bids are censored by a number that serves as an upper
limit of bids (in Dutch auctions a strategically equivalent starting price).
We investigate whether anchoring bias persists in auctions if subjects
are exposed to uninformative and informative anchors, and whether such
exposure increases bids. The adoption of two di↵erent anchor types allows
us to identify interaction e↵ects. Thus, we also test whether anchoring e↵ects
are non-additive.
Our study provides a couple of interesting findings. Comparing treat-
ments with and without an uninformative anchor clearly demonstrates that
anchoring bias does exist and exposure to irrelevant numbers does increase
bids. Our data reveal a strong anchoring bias triggered by the informative an-
chor. A higher maximal permissible bid increases bids in first-price auctions
whereas the e↵ect is the opposite in Dutch auction. Using all observations
with a starting price or upper limit in both auction formats, we learn that
the di↵erence is due to the auction format itself. However, in Dutch auctions,
there is a secondary e↵ect that prevails and suppresses bids. This result is
consistent with the two-process theory of reasoning as a higher starting price
provides a longer time span for analytical reasoning. Finally, the interaction
e↵ects of the two di↵erent kinds of anchors are unanimously negative. This
result is consistent with the literature as anchoring bias does not tend to be
additive.
Our experimental results provide evidence that strategies in games can
be anchored. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) define anchoring as a cognitive
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bias that influences judgment. Our experiment shows that the anchoring
bias also extends to the realm of strategic interaction.
We demonstrate that the observed deviations from rational behavior can
be explained either by the fact that subjects are not engaged in payo↵-
maximizing behavior or that the beliefs are biased. Consider two interre-
lated but di↵erent cognitive processes – Process I: The anchored agent forms
beliefs about the strategy of the other player which are influenced by the
anchor; Process II: The agent’s strategy is biased directly by the anchor,
beliefs may be correct. A straightforward test for the di↵erence between
anchored beliefs and direct anchoring in games is possible if upward biased
beliefs induce lower rather than higher best-responses.25 In games like auc-
tions, however, the di↵erence between the two processes cannot be identified
unless beliefs are elicited.26 Identifying the two processes is the natural next
step of improving our understanding of the nature of the anchoring bias in
games.
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